Want to understand Iran today? A historian tells you what you need to know

Christian Emery explores how revolution, repression and recurring crisis have shaped Iran’s recent past – and continue to define its volatile present

A black‑and‑white photograph of a man in a suit and glasses standing above a dense crowd outdoors, raising one arm as people look up toward him. Stone columns and a metal fence frame the background, giving the scene a formal, public setting.

Published: May 22, 2026 at 4:30 PM

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Iran today is once again facing a moment of profound crisis and uncertainty. US-Israeli airstrikes have severely degraded much of the country’s leadership and infrastructure, while ordinary Iranians face repression from a regime that appears no more capable of protecting them from external attack than from violence carried out by its own security services.

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The consequences of this already destructive war remain uncertain, but the underlying questions it raises – about state strength and legitimacy, the impact of foreign intervention, Iran’s regional power, and the potential for popular mobilisation to realise a better political and economic future – are not new. They have resurfaced across successive regimes and upheavals, and are best understood by tracing Iran’s modern political development over the past century.

Product of tumult

It was just over 100 years ago that Reza Khan, who adopted the dynastic name Pahlavi, founded the last line of Shahs in Iran. He was a tall, imposing and intensely ambitious military strongman whose modernising zeal and extraordinary rise – from a private soldier in the Russian-created Persian Cossack Brigade to head of the Imperial Armed Forces, prime minister and, ultimately, Shah in 1925 – set Iran on the path towards becoming a modern political state.

But Reza Khan was also a product of the tumultuous political events of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that eventually convinced the Iranian political classes that no progress could be made towards modernisation under the ailing Qajar dynasty (1794–1925). The Qajars had ceded extensive territories on Iran’s northern and eastern frontiers in a succession of disastrous wars with the Russian empire, while diplomatic pressure from the British empire led to the loss of Iranian influence in Afghanistan.

A black‑and‑white photograph of a uniformed man standing beside a young child in an outdoor garden or park. The man wears a high‑collared military tunic, belt and cap with an insignia, while the child stands close at his side in light clothing. Trees and a curved path or pond edge form the soft, natural background.

Reza Khan with his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who succeeded him as Shah in 1941 – and was the last to hold that title (Image by Topfoto)

By the late 19th century, Iran’s borders largely resembled what they look like today. Chronically indebted as a result of their economic profligacy and dysfunctional state bureaucracy, the Qajars tried – and, ultimately, failed – to balance the books by selling off national assets, granting exclusive concessions and monopoly rights to foreign entities. This provoked widespread resentment that from 1905 fuelled Iran’s first modern pro-democracy movement, known as the Constitutional Revolution, which sought to place legal limits on royal power through a written constitution and a legislative assembly. This struggle was infused with an emerging nationalism that brought energy to the task of building a strong central state by framing it as the fulfilment of Iran’s distinct cultural achievements.

The critical urgency for radical reform and a strong centralised state was underscored by Iran’s traumatic experiences during the First World War. Despite declaring neutrality, Iran became a battleground for clashes between Russian and Ottoman forces, while the British occupied the south of the country to protect their oil interests and access to India. The Qajar regime’s obvious helplessness, together with the scarcities caused by the conflict, sparked ethnic and tribal uprising inside Iran. By the end of the First World War, crop failures, famine and disease had killed more than 2 million Iranians.

A black‑and‑white photograph of an oil well erupting in a tall, forceful column of crude oil. The metal drilling rig stands at the centre with a small shed at its base, while several people observe from the ground. Barren, hilly terrain surrounds the scene, giving it a remote, rugged atmosphere.

Oil spouts from one of the first wells in Iran, c1909 (Image by Getty Images)

Failed state

Iran in 1920 was, in modern terminology, a failed state. It had no standing army and little government capacity beyond Tehran. Several of its provinces were controlled by armed rebels, foreign armies or local warlords. Iranians had had enough, and looked to a strong military leader who could at least implement radical restructuring of what was by then a tired and fractured country. The scene was set for Reza Khan to march on Tehran and stage a coup, which he did in 1921 – though it would be another four years until he seized the crown.

After being appointed commander of the army and then minister of war, Reza Khan set about creating the first standing army raised by Iran in many centuries. The second pillar on which he built his new state was an expanded and professionalised state bureaucracy. Ministries that had barely existed in 1921 – interior, education, justice – were staffed with a new generation of technocratic civil servants. To pay for it all, Reza Khan expanded the state’s capacity to challenge tax avoidance, collect customs duties and increase oil revenues.

The Pahlavi state may have defined itself in opposition to the incompetent and chaotic latter Qajar period but it never wished to break the connection between Iran as a modern state and its role as the inheritor of the glories of the Persian empire and a civilisational foundation of world history. Perhaps insecure about their own humble origins, the Pahlavi Shahs frequently invoked the Achaemenid empire (c550–330 BC) – the first transcontinental empire stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indus river. Indeed, the new Pahlavi crown created for Reza Khan in 1926 was inspired by the Achaemenid motifs depicted on the ramparts of Persepolis built two millennia before by Darius the Great.

A carved stone relief showing two bearded figures facing one another, each wearing a tall, banded headdress and patterned garments. One figure holds out a large two‑handled vessel toward the other, their detailed hair, clothing and profiles emphasising the ceremonial nature of the exchange.

A relief from the ancient city of Persepolis shows a delegation bearing gifts for Darius the Great, who ruled the Persian Achaemenid empire at its peak in the sixth century BC. Reza Khan, who founded the last, Pahlavi dynasty of Shahs of Iran, invoked that ancient power to add legitimacy to his own reign (Image by Getty Images)

Reza Khan had undoubtedly built a modern state, but it was also one that, by the 1930s, was firmly authoritarian in nature. His downfall, however, was not orchestrated by domestic opponents, but rather by the British and Soviets, who once again asserted their right to occupy the parts of Iran they deemed strategically vital to their interests.

These two powers were already suspicious of Reza Khan’s well-known pro-German sympathies, but Iran’s situation completely changed in 1941 when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. Iran, already producing millions of tonnes of oil that was essential for the Allied war effort, became a vital land bridge for resupplying the Soviet war machine. So when, in August 1941, the Shah refused an ultimatum from the Allies to expel all German nationals, he immediately found his country invaded by the Soviets in the north and by British units in the south.

On 16 September 1941, as Soviet and British troops occupied Tehran, the Shah was forced to abdicate, passing the throne to his son. He died less than three years later, a bitter and reclusive exile in Johannesburg.

Shortly after his father’s abdication, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was sworn in as the next Shah before Iran’s national parliament, under the shadow of foreign occupation. He was only 21 years old and, although groomed for the succession from an early age, he lacked the commanding presence and natural confidence of his father. He managed to secure Iran’s postwar sovereignty only by agreeing to place his country’s entire national infrastructure at the disposal of the Allied war effort in return for a formal legal commitment from Stalin and Churchill that all foreign troops would be removed from Iran within six months of the end of that war.

A black‑and‑white photograph of soldiers marching in formation through an industrial complex with tall brick buildings and smoking chimneys. The troops wear helmets and carry rifles and packs as they move past signs in English and Persian that read “Smoking Not Allowed.”

Riflemen of the British Indian Army march into an Iranian oil refinery in 1941, after the Shah refused to expel Germans. British forces withdrew in March 1946; the occupying Soviets were more recalcitrant (Image by Bridgeman Images)

Three realities emerged at the end of the conflict that would shape the next three decades. First, a weakened and indebted Britain, which had exerted enormous influence over Iran’s commercial and political life for the previous century, was no longer the dominant power it had once been. Second, the critical role that oil played in both wartime victory and postwar recovery would drive soaring global demand. And third, Washington’s growing concern over Soviet expansionism would anchor Iran within its broader strategy of containment.

Cold War collateral

All of these factors were reinforced in early 1946 when Iran became the locus for an early flashpoint in the Cold War. The US and UK had removed their forces from Iran ahead of the agreed schedule. Stalin, however, refused to follow suit, and demanded substantial oil rights as well as the recognition of an autonomous Soviet-backed republic in Iranian Azerbaijan. His opportunism backfired. By the end of 1946, Stalin had retreated following a combination of intense American political pressure and wily diplomacy from the Iranian prime minister, Ahmad Qavam.

Having enjoyed a boost in public support thanks to his government’s handling of the 1946 crisis, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi started to step out of his father’s shadow. In the early years of his rule, he had eased his father’s restrictions on political life inside Iran. But this changed dramatically on the afternoon of 4 February 1949, when the Shah was shot and wounded in an assassination attempt during a visit to Tehran University. An investigation determined that the assailant had links to the Iranian communist party, known inside the country as the Tudeh Party.

Political freedoms were stifled overnight. Martial law was declared, protests were banned, hundreds of Tudeh leaders were arrested, leftist newspapers were closed, and soon the Tudeh itself was banned.

The Shah capitalised on the public sympathy he received after the attempt on his life to change the Iranian constitution. It now gave him the power to choose his prime minister, dismiss parliament, and effectively block legislation by forming a second chamber controlled by his supporters.

On 16 November 1949, the Shah was welcomed to Washington, DC with full military honours and a 21-gun salute. Over his month-long visit, he tried to persuade the Truman administration that, if it could provide a massive military aid package, he could transform Iran into a major military power that could contain the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf.

A black‑and‑white photograph of a grand motorcade moving down a wide city avenue lined with crowds. Police motorcycles lead the procession, followed by cars, with the U.S. Capitol visible in the distance. A large banner stretched above the street reads “Welcome His Majesty the Shah of Iran!” beneath an American flag.

A large motorcade escorts Mohammad Reza Pahlavi through Washington, DC in 1949. The Truman administration provided only limited military aid to help Iran deter the Soviet threat (Image by Getty Images)

He received sympathy for his analysis of the Soviet threat, but limited support for his claim that Iran could deter it through military power. At that time, the State Department was opposed to flooding the region with arms, believing that it would fuel internal conflict and produce states that, while appearing militarily strong, were politically unstable, unpopular, and therefore prone to collapse. Economic modernisation and improved living standards were seen as the most important methods for countering communism.

The Shah was undeterred, but his ambitions were not matched by government revenues. The raw deal Iran was receiving from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company made nationalisation politically and economically irresistible, and that was achieved by majority vote in 1951.

The UK responded by first crippling Iran’s economy through an oil embargo, then persuading the Eisenhower administration to remove the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had orchestrated the nationalisation plan. The joint CIA-MI6-orchestrated coup initially backfired, spooking the Shah to briefly flee the country. With the assistance of conservative elements inside Iran, though, Mosaddegh was eventually arrested – another affront to Iranian democracy to be endured. Iran’s nationalisation of oil wasn’t reversed, but a consortium of western oil companies received about 50 per cent of the profits.

Superpower competition

Under President Richard Nixon, the US-Iranian strategic relationship underwent a major shift. Nixon faced a dilemma: the 1970s marked the height of superpower competition in the developing world, with US assessments pointing to a growing Soviet threat in the Middle East, yet after Vietnam it was politically impossible to deploy large numbers of US troops abroad. At the same time, the UK announced that it could no longer project power east of Suez. Washington therefore needed a regional policeman to ensure that Persian Gulf oil flowed to the west. The resulting ‘Nixon Doctrine’ cast the Shah in that role.

In 1972, then, the Shah was effectively given a blank cheque to purchase almost any American weaponry he desired, short of nuclear arms. The Shah saw an opportunity to realise his vision of Iran as a regional hegemon, and to restore its imperial grandeur. His growing domestic opposition, however, viewed the US as strengthening the state’s capacity for repression rather than using its influence to press for reform.

The resulting splurge on military hardware was paid for by a transformation in the Iranian economy. In December 1973, at the height of the Arab oil embargo against nations supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War, the Shah declared that oil had been absurdly undervalued as a commodity. During the embargo, which was lifted in 1974, the price of oil soared from around US$3 to US$12 per barrel. Iran’s oil revenues grew from US$1.1bn in 1970 to a staggering US$18bn in 1974.

A large outdoor gathering of men wearing turbans and traditional robes, many seated closely together while one central figure stands to address them. Several people hold signs with portraits and Persian text, and the crowd fills the frame, suggesting a moment of collective political or religious mobilisation.

Protesters led by Islamic clerics pictured in Tehran, December 1978. They demanded the removal of the Shah and the return from exile of Ayatollah Khomeini (Image by Getty Images)

The economy was growing by 8–10 per cent per year, and the Shah was ecstatic with the economic progress he was achieving. By the mid-1970s, though, the huge amounts of cash flowing into the economy fuelled endemic corruption and chronic inflation, squeezing all classes of Iranians except the absolute elite.

By the latter half of the 1970s, the Shah had alienated virtually all sections of society. The middle class faced a cost-of-living crisis, and couldn’t access the patronage network that controlled access to the best jobs in government and industry. The socially conservative merchant classes were economically marginalised, opposed the Shah’s modernisation policies, and maintained strong ties to the Shia clergy. The clerics opposed his land reforms, social liberalism and support for the US.

From his home in exile in Paris, the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist opposition, maintained an uncompromising and clear philosophy of resistance, disseminated through a far-reaching network of mosques and seminaries.

Then, as now, the regime had no answers to these social and economic grievances, and resorted to repression to quell the proliferating protests. It had no effect. By 1978, dissent against the Shah’s rule reached a critical mass, eventually prompting some of the largest public demonstrations ever recorded in modern history.

Returning in triumph

The Shah, paralysed by the realisation that he had lost the support of his people and suffering from terminal cancer, chose to leave Iran – and, to his credit, not to initiate a bloodbath in a desperate attempt to preserve his crown. On 1 February 1979, Khomeini returned in triumph from exile in Paris. The Shah’s 300,000-strong army evaporated in the face of (mostly unarmed) protesters.

The Shah had been dislodged by a broad revolutionary coalition, but few disputed Khomeini’s place at its head. Once the clerical revolutionaries under Khomeini’s leadership achieved control over the instruments of state, they set about embedding Islamist values and laws into modern 20th-century Iran. This required intrusive supervision of the people’s moral character, the policing of women’s choice of clothing, and the imposition of radically new judicial and educational systems.

The Iranian Revolution was one of the 20th century’s major geopolitical shocks, and political Islam exploded onto the international scene. It was the first revolution to be televised, and images of students scaling the US embassy in Tehran shattered the uprising’s international image. That event, which led to dozens of Americans being held hostage for 444 days, permanently ruptured relations with Washington and ushered in the post-revolutionary era of pariah status and sanctions imposed on Iran. It is hard to imagine a more disastrous decision in Iran’s modern history.

A black‑and‑white photograph of women marching in formation along a city street, wearing dark headscarves and coats. Each carries a rifle with a flower placed at the barrel’s tip. Tall buildings line the background, and more marchers follow behind, giving the scene an organised, purposeful atmosphere.

Armed Iranian women in Tehran march past the US embassy containing dozens of hostages, February 1980 (Image by Alamy)

Iran was the victim of an unprovoked Iraqi invasion in September 1980, but it is highly questionable whether Iraq would have acted had Iran not been isolated and engaged in a major confrontation with the world’s most powerful superpower.

In any case, the total war waged by Iraq had a profound impact on Iranian politics and society. Between 180,000 and 200,000 Iranians were killed, and nearly every family suffered loss or injury. Politically, the war infused the revolution with intense nationalism and entrenched narratives of victimhood, resistance and sacrifice that remain core to the regime’s identity. It is this uncompromising war generation that now holds the senior political and military positions in the country.

Iran’s political system gradually evolved, yet the promised political and social freedoms failed to materialise. The Islamic Republic instead became a highly centralised and increasingly repressive state in which the supreme leader exercises authority over the legislative, executive and judicial branches.

At the time of writing, Iranians are caught between the anvil of a government willing to use extreme violence to suppress dissent and the hammer of US-Israeli military strikes that show no sign of delivering liberation. And a review of Iran’s modern history points toward a deeply uncertain and troubling future.

Christian Emery is associate professor in international politics at University College London, and author of US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution (Macmillan, 2013)

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This article was first published in the May 2026 issue of HistoryExtra Magazine

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